The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recently been considering the issue of Conscientious Objection in relation to participation in Abortion. Originally the proposals before the Assembly regarded Conscientious Objection not as a fundamental right but as a problem indeed the original title of the proposals before the Assembly was "Women’s access to lawful medical care: the problem of unregulated use of conscientious objection"
but this was amended to read "The right to conscientious objection in lawful medical care" and Para 1 of the Resolution as eventually passed by the Assembly reads
"1. No person, hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any manner because of a refusal to perform, accommodate, assist or submit to an abortion, the performance of a human miscarriage, or euthanasia or any act which could cause the death of a human foetus or embryo, for any reason."
The amendments to the original proposals were initiated by two Parliamentarians Senator Ronan Mullen of the Irish Oireachtas (Parliament) and Mr Luca Volonte of the Italian Parliament. I had the good fortune to meet Senator Ronan during my recent visit to Dublin and I was enormously impressed by him.
The Resolution does not of itself have any direct legal force since the Council of Europe is not the European Union and does not make law. However the Council does have the role of defending the European Convention on Human Rights and it administers the European Court of Human Rights. Because of this resolutions by the Council of Europe are considered by the Human Right Court when making decisions concerning the Convention As an example look at the Judgment in the case of Layla Sahin v Turkey paras 66, 68, 69, 136 and para 18 of the dissenting judgment by Judge Tulkens.
Similarly when making arguments in UK Courts it is possible to refer to Resolutions by the Council of Europe or indeed any other other International organisation where those resolutions are relevant to a question before the Court.
I would see this Resolution defending Conscientious Objection as being valuable in protecting Medical staff who may be pressurised to participate in or indirectly assist in Abortion. The resolution specifically refers to the fact that "No person, hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against"
because of their refusal to "accommodate, assist" with abortion. The fact that the Resolution specifically refers to discrimination could be quite significant in terms of the Anti-Discrimination provisions in The Equality Act 2010
At present most Doctors and Nurses in Great Britain who object to Abortion rely for their protection on section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 which says
"no person shall be under any duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection"
The leading case concerning s4 is Janaway v Salford HA [1988], 3 All ER 1079 HL where a doctor's secretary (Janaway) refused to type a referral letter for an abortion and was unsuccessful when she claimed that she was protected by s4. The House of Lords, in interpreting the word "participate" decided to give the word its "ordinary and natural meaning" which meant that s4 only applied to those who were being required to take part in an Abortion (e.g. the gynaecologist, the anaesthetist, or the assisting nurses) and did not cover ancillary involvement such as signing an Abortion Certificate or referring a patient to another Doctor who would carry out an Abortion. The general effect of the Janaway case has been an assumption that Doctors in particular only have very limited legal rights to object to involvement in the Abortion process. However though Janaway is still good law it is no longer the last word on the subject of conscientious objection.
Sections 10 and 19 of the Equality Act combine to make it unlawful for an employer to
apply a provision, criterion or practice which puts, or would put, persons [ie with a religious or philosophical objection to abortion] at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons [who do not have any religious or philosophical objection to abortion]
The defence to an allegation of indirect discrimination is that the "provision, criterion or practice" is a " proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim"
It is when Courts are applying the test of proportionality that Resolutions such as that by the Council of Europe come into play to protect Doctors, Nurses, Pharmacists or even Health Service Typists who do not want to assist in Abortion in any capacity. Similarly Religious Hospitals or Organisations which may find themselves being pressurised to agree to Abortion services as a condition for receiving NHS contracts could use the resolution to allege that they were being Discriminated against.
Certainly the resolution will not provide a magic bullet defence to any person or organisation who finds themselves being pressurised with regard to Abortion but it certainly provides a moral and potentially a legal support to those people who recognise that unborn children are human beings too. After all everyone who is reading this Blog was a foetus once.
Wednesday, 13 October 2010
Thursday, 30 September 2010
Equality Act - 1 October 2010
The majority of the provisions in The Equality Act 2010 are due to come into force on 1st October 2010. The details are contained in Statutory Instrument 2010 No. 2317
The relevance to Religion Law issues is that the 2010 Act unifies all Anti-discrimination legislation and therefore replaces the
The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003
Part 2 The Equality Act 2006 (Religious Discrimination in Goods & Services)
The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007
In theory new Act does not change the law but merely consolidates it into one statute however we shall have to see what happens in practice. In the short term there should be no major changes to how equality law is applied where there is conflict between religious discrimination and same sex discrimination.
In the longer term the fact that marriage and civil partnership is now a "protected characteristic" may lead to additional pressures on religious organisations (ie the vast majority) that do not recognise civil partnerships as equivalent to marriage.
Section 193 of the Act which relates to Charities could have an important and harmful long term effect where it says
(1)A person does not contravene this Act only by restricting the provision of benefits to persons who share a protected characteristic if—
(a)the person acts in pursuance of a charitable instrument, and
(b)the provision of the benefits is within subsection (2).
(2)The provision of benefits is within this subsection if it is—
(a)a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, or
(b)for the purpose of preventing or compensating for a disadvantage linked to the protected characteristic
As the case of the Catholic Adoption Agencies and the case of Ladelle
have both shown the idea of "proportionality" is a dangerously subjective concept and ithere is a great danger that this clause will can be used to force religious charities to choose between closing down or acting contrary to their religious ethos and principles.
The Government is still consulting on section 202 which will allow Civil Partnerships to be held on religious premises As I Blogged on 23 February
the main concern with this provision is the possibility that once Civil Partnerships become possible on Religious Premises it will subtly become unlawful for any religious premises to refuse to offer them.
The Government has not brought into force Parts 1 (Socio -Economic Inequalities) or Part 11 Chapter 1 (Public-Sector Equality Duty) and is consulting on these provisions. It is quite possible that they will not be brought into force
The relevance to Religion Law issues is that the 2010 Act unifies all Anti-discrimination legislation and therefore replaces the
The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003
Part 2 The Equality Act 2006 (Religious Discrimination in Goods & Services)
The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007
In theory new Act does not change the law but merely consolidates it into one statute however we shall have to see what happens in practice. In the short term there should be no major changes to how equality law is applied where there is conflict between religious discrimination and same sex discrimination.
In the longer term the fact that marriage and civil partnership is now a "protected characteristic" may lead to additional pressures on religious organisations (ie the vast majority) that do not recognise civil partnerships as equivalent to marriage.
Section 193 of the Act which relates to Charities could have an important and harmful long term effect where it says
(1)A person does not contravene this Act only by restricting the provision of benefits to persons who share a protected characteristic if—
(a)the person acts in pursuance of a charitable instrument, and
(b)the provision of the benefits is within subsection (2).
(2)The provision of benefits is within this subsection if it is—
(a)a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, or
(b)for the purpose of preventing or compensating for a disadvantage linked to the protected characteristic
As the case of the Catholic Adoption Agencies and the case of Ladelle
have both shown the idea of "proportionality" is a dangerously subjective concept and ithere is a great danger that this clause will can be used to force religious charities to choose between closing down or acting contrary to their religious ethos and principles.
The Government is still consulting on section 202 which will allow Civil Partnerships to be held on religious premises As I Blogged on 23 February
the main concern with this provision is the possibility that once Civil Partnerships become possible on Religious Premises it will subtly become unlawful for any religious premises to refuse to offer them.
The Government has not brought into force Parts 1 (Socio -Economic Inequalities) or Part 11 Chapter 1 (Public-Sector Equality Duty) and is consulting on these provisions. It is quite possible that they will not be brought into force
Wednesday, 29 September 2010
Iona Institute Talk 24 September 2010
On the 24th September I was one of the speakers at a conference in Dublin organised by The Iona Institute. Below is a copy of the speech I made which reviews the various cases involving religious freedom issues which have come before the British Courts over the past few years. For more details about the conference read HERE and HERE
The best summary of the current position for Religious believers in Britain was given by Dr Rowan Williams Archbishop of Canterbury when he said in an Interview on 11 December 2009
“The trouble with a lot of Government initiatives about faith is that they assume it is a problem, it’s an eccentricity, it’s practised by oddities, foreigners and minorities"
and a similar comment was made by Catholic Archbishop Peter Smith
"religion is regarded as a legally permissible private eccentricity; allowable behind closed doors once a week, but not in any way to be given expression in public or working life"
The growing secularisation of British life is of course something shared with much of Europe but two specific problems in Britain arise from the 30 year history of the Northern Ireland troubles followed by the September 11 2001 attacks in New York and the July 7 2005 attack in London. In consequence Religion is often subconsciously seen in Britain as not merely a harmless eccentricity but as a potentially dangerous eccentricity.
LEGISLATION
Because the legal position relating to religion in the UK differs in detail between the four nations which form the Union I shall primarily concentrate on the position in England and on the principle English cases. The main legal provisions which are relevant are
The Human Rights Act 1998
The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003
Part 2 The Equality Act 2006 (Religious Discrimination in Goods & Services)
The Human Rights Act incorporated into UK Law the European Convention on Human Rights including Article 9 of the Convention which says
9.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
9.2 Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others
As I hope to demonstrate in this talk almost any restriction on freedom to manifest religion can be justified under the caveats in 9.2
ARTICLE 9
The first major test of Article 9 came with the case of Begum where schoolgirl Shabina Begum wanted to wear the Islamic Jilbab in school, the Jilbab being contrary to the School rules. The Judicial Committee of the House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court) held that the rules of the School were justified under 9.2. The most important words in the Begum judgment came in the judgment of Lord Hoffman where he said at para 51
“Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to manifest one's religion at any time and place of one's own choosing”
That phrase, which was quite understandable in its context, has since been repeated in virtually every case where religious believers have tried to rely upon Article 9 and in has made Article 9 of little practical value
RELIGIOUS AND GAY RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT
Though there have been some other attempts to utilise Article 9.2 the main legal thrust since Begum has been under the 2003 Regulations and the 2006 Act and the main challenge involving these legislative provisions is that they were passed in association with
The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007
which has made discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation illegal in both employment and the delivery of goods and services.
The main case involving a clash between the principle of freedom of religious belief and non discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was the case of Ladelle. Lillian Ladelle was a Registrar of Marriages employed by Islington Council in London and when the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force she was also designated as a Registrar of Civil Partnerships. As a Christian she disapproved of same sex partnerships and so arranged to swap Civil Partnership ceremonies with colleagues who were willing to perform them. It is important to note that it was accepted throughout all the legal proceedings that no same sex couple were ever deprived of a partnership ceremony and the registrar service in Islington was not affected or reduced.
Unlike the position in Ireland it is not a criminal offence in England for a registrar to refuse to perform a marriage or a civil partnership ceremony however 2 gay members of staff in Islington complained to Islington Council about Lilian's practice of arranging that she would not perform same sex partnerships and she was ordered to perform such ceremonies. She claimed religious discrimination and the case went to an Employment Tribunal where she won her case, the ET said
"This is a case where there is a direct conflict between the legislative protection afforded to religion and belief and the legislative protection afforded to sexual orientation .... One set of rights cannot overrule the other set of rights"
The idea that Courts seek to balance conflicting rights is an old one in Law and it was therefore surprising that both the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal overturned the Tribunal decision. The Master of the Rolls (The Senior English Civil Judge) said
“Ms Ladele’s objection was based on her view of marriage, which was not a core part of her religion; and Islington’s requirement in no way prevented her from worshipping as she wished.”
The idea that a Civil Court could or should decide what is or is not a “core part” of a religion is startling and disturbing because on that basis one can almost ignore every form of Religious Discrimination on the basis that the belief is not a “core” part of the religion. In addition the remark that Ladelle was still free to worship, in her own time, is extraordinary in the context of a claim about religious discrimination in the workplace. The point is that she was faced with a choice of either leaving the job she had done without criticism for many years or acting contrary to her conscience.
Another phrase by the Master of the Rolls in Ladelle demonstrated complete inability to get to grips with the real issues in the case when he said
“It would have been no more acceptable for someone with Ms Ladele's views to refuse to perform civil partnerships than it would have been for a militant gay registrar to refuse to perform marriages between people who, for religious reasons, objected to homosexual relationships or civil partnerships.”
The real difficulty with this remark was that it fails to distinguish between dislike of the individual and moral complicity in a wrongful act. The Court also failed to really grapple with the idea of an employer making reasonable accommodations for an employees religious beliefs where such accommodation would not prejudice the work of the employer
The Ladelle case was firmly followed in the case of McFarlane v Relate where a Christian relationship counsellor asked not to have to counsel same sex couples re their sexual problems. In an attempt to appeal the decision Lord Carey (a former Archbishop of Canterbury) put in an Affidavit asking for understanding for Christian objection in these situations. This led to an extraordinary response from Lord Justice Lords who said that giving any legal protection to manifestations of religious belief would lead to a “Theocracy”. A Theocracy, of course, imposes its beliefs on others and it is in my view arguable that what the courts have done in Ladelle and Mcfarlane is much closer to the spirit of a Theocracy than the requests by these Claimants that their freedom of conscience should be respected.
In his rejection of Lord Careys concerns about the trend of anti-religious, and specifically anti-Christian decisions by Courts dealing with religious freedom cases Lord Justice Lords said
“Lord Carey’s observations are misplaced. The judges have never, so far as I know, sought to equate the condemnation by some Christians of homosexuality on religious grounds with homophobia, or to regard that position as “disreputable”. Nor have they likened Christians to bigots”
However only 2 months later in a decision in the Supreme Court HJ (Iran) regarding the rights of gay asylum seekers Lord Hope referred to
“The rampant homophobic teaching that right-wing evangelical Christian churches indulge in throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa”
WEARING A CROSS
The next major issue in religious freedom involved the wearing of a cross by an Employee of British Airways Nadia Eweida BA claimed that this cross was in breach of its uniform policy though it accepted that it permitted Muslims to wear Hijabs and Sikhs to wear Turbans and Kara bracelets. The Court decided that Eweida was not discriminated against because
“visible display of the cross [was not] a requirement of the Christian faith”
This decision is particularly hard to square with another decision where a school was told that it must allow a Sikh schoolgirl Sakira Singh to wear a Kara bracelet even though the court in that case accepted
“the claimant is not obliged by her religion to wear a Kara, it is clearly in her case [an] extremely important indication of her faith"
The logic of the decision in Eweida was followed in the case of Chaplin v Exeter NHS Trust where the Employment Tribunal said
“there is no mandatory requirement of the Christian faith that a Christian should wear a crucifix"
As with the case of Ladelle the Courts were assuming that they had the right to allocate levels of seriousness to religious belief and practice
FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS
Serious though these cases were a far more fundamental issue has arisen as to the extent to which religious organisations are going to be allowed to exercise freedom in their internal structures. The most serious example of this was the case of R v JFS School. Formerly known as the Jewish Free School JFS selected pupils who were designated as Jewish according to principles laid down by the Chief Rabbi in accordance with millennia old Jewish law under which a person is Jew either through conversion or through matrilineal descent.
The child 'R' in the case who had a Jewish father and non Jewish mother was therefore not classified as a Jew and so he was not eligible to go to JFS. His mother had actually converted to Judaism but via a reformed rather than an orthodox Synagogue and therefore her conversion was not recognised as valid by the Chief Rabbi who is Orthodox. The Supreme Court by a majority of 5-4 held that the rules applied by the Chief Rabbi were racist and therefore illegal.
Lady Hale in the main majority judgment said in para. 66
"Is the criterion adopted by the Chief Rabbi, and thus without question by the school, based upon the child’s ethnic origins? In my view, it clearly is. M was rejected because of his mother’s ethnic origins, which were Italian and Roman Catholic."
whilst Lord Rogers put the alternative view
“Lady Hale says that M was rejected because of his mother’s ethnic origins which were Italian and Roman Catholic. I respectfully disagree. His mother could have been as Italian in origin as Sophia Loren and as Roman Catholic as the Pope for all that the governors cared: the only thing that mattered was that she had not converted to Judaism under Orthodox auspices”
Whatever the legal merits of the decision in terms of theoretical law the principle behind the JFS decision is astonishing. What the Supreme Court in effect said was that it had the right to overrule the Chief Rabbi and to say that someone was a Jew when the Chief Rabbi said that he was not. I rhetorically asked in the Catholic Herald “what next. Will the Courts say that someone is a Catholic or indeed a Catholic Priest even though the Pope says they are not” The right of a religion (or indeed any organisation) to determine its own membership is fundamental to the survival of a free society and yet that fundamental principle seems to be being ignored by Court interpretations of Equality legislation
Another case involved the application of the Sexual Orientation Regulations (SOR's) to Catholic Adoption Agencies. There were over 20 Catholic charitable agencies attached to various Diocese many of which had operated for over 100 years providing a variety of social services including adoption services. They did not themselves arrange adoptions which remain the responsibility of local authorities but they were employed by local authorities to find prospective adoptive parents. They were particularly successful in finding parents for children who were hard to adopt often because of disability or for other reasons.
The problem for the agencies was that adoption services were covered by the SOR's and therefore the agencies would be obliged to accept same sex couples as potential adoptive parents contrary to Catholic teaching. Most of the agencies caved in to this and separated from the Church however two tried to carry on by amending their constitution to specifically state that adoption services would only be provided to heterosexual couples. Having such a clause would allow them to take advantage of a specific provision in the SOR's which permits Charities to discriminate if that is set out in their constitution
(NB This exemption is standard in all UK anti-discrimination legislation and, for example, permits charities to be formed which provide services only for women, people from a particular country or persons suffering from a specific disability).
The Charity Commission regulates charities and has to approve changes to their constitutions and it refused to allow the adoption agencies to change their constitution because “Discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is a serious matter “ What was of no importance was the religious nature of the Charity and no respect was shown to the fact that it had been formed by the Catholic Church which naturally wanted its own charity to act in accordance with Catholic teaching. No regard was paid to the idea of an organisation having the right to its own identity
THE FUTURE
How the future will develop for religious freedom in the UK in the future is difficult to tell. We are constantly being told that we are a secular society and at the same time that we are a multi-faith society and the conflict between those two positions has not yet been truly faced up to let alone resolved.
One new factor is the economic crisis which has already caused our new coalition government to look to charities and voluntary groups as having an increasingly important social role under the government policy of “the big society”. A fact that some government ministers are beginning to articulate is that the majority of charities and voluntary organisations have a religious basis or backing and there is a real question as to how far government is prepared to allow religious groups their own freedom of action.
In his speech in Westminster Hall on 17 September 2010 the Pope set out this challenge to Government when he said
“I am convinced that, within this country too, there are many areas in which the Church and the public authorities can work together for the good of citizens, in harmony with Britain’s long-standing tradition. For such cooperation to be possible, religious bodies – including institutions linked to the Catholic Church – need to be free to act in accordance with their own principles and specific convictions based upon the faith and the official teaching of the Church. In this way, such basic rights as religious freedom, freedom of conscience and freedom of association are guaranteed”
Whether government and courts will allow religious organisations this level of freedom remains an open question but the omens are not good
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
(A talk for the Iona Institute 24 September 2010
by Neil Addison (Barrister), National Director, Thomas More Legal Centre)
by Neil Addison (Barrister), National Director, Thomas More Legal Centre)
The best summary of the current position for Religious believers in Britain was given by Dr Rowan Williams Archbishop of Canterbury when he said in an Interview on 11 December 2009
“The trouble with a lot of Government initiatives about faith is that they assume it is a problem, it’s an eccentricity, it’s practised by oddities, foreigners and minorities"
and a similar comment was made by Catholic Archbishop Peter Smith
"religion is regarded as a legally permissible private eccentricity; allowable behind closed doors once a week, but not in any way to be given expression in public or working life"
The growing secularisation of British life is of course something shared with much of Europe but two specific problems in Britain arise from the 30 year history of the Northern Ireland troubles followed by the September 11 2001 attacks in New York and the July 7 2005 attack in London. In consequence Religion is often subconsciously seen in Britain as not merely a harmless eccentricity but as a potentially dangerous eccentricity.
LEGISLATION
Because the legal position relating to religion in the UK differs in detail between the four nations which form the Union I shall primarily concentrate on the position in England and on the principle English cases. The main legal provisions which are relevant are
The Human Rights Act 1998
The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003
Part 2 The Equality Act 2006 (Religious Discrimination in Goods & Services)
The Human Rights Act incorporated into UK Law the European Convention on Human Rights including Article 9 of the Convention which says
9.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
9.2 Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others
As I hope to demonstrate in this talk almost any restriction on freedom to manifest religion can be justified under the caveats in 9.2
ARTICLE 9
The first major test of Article 9 came with the case of Begum where schoolgirl Shabina Begum wanted to wear the Islamic Jilbab in school, the Jilbab being contrary to the School rules. The Judicial Committee of the House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court) held that the rules of the School were justified under 9.2. The most important words in the Begum judgment came in the judgment of Lord Hoffman where he said at para 51
“Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to manifest one's religion at any time and place of one's own choosing”
That phrase, which was quite understandable in its context, has since been repeated in virtually every case where religious believers have tried to rely upon Article 9 and in has made Article 9 of little practical value
RELIGIOUS AND GAY RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT
Though there have been some other attempts to utilise Article 9.2 the main legal thrust since Begum has been under the 2003 Regulations and the 2006 Act and the main challenge involving these legislative provisions is that they were passed in association with
The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007
which has made discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation illegal in both employment and the delivery of goods and services.
The main case involving a clash between the principle of freedom of religious belief and non discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was the case of Ladelle. Lillian Ladelle was a Registrar of Marriages employed by Islington Council in London and when the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force she was also designated as a Registrar of Civil Partnerships. As a Christian she disapproved of same sex partnerships and so arranged to swap Civil Partnership ceremonies with colleagues who were willing to perform them. It is important to note that it was accepted throughout all the legal proceedings that no same sex couple were ever deprived of a partnership ceremony and the registrar service in Islington was not affected or reduced.
Unlike the position in Ireland it is not a criminal offence in England for a registrar to refuse to perform a marriage or a civil partnership ceremony however 2 gay members of staff in Islington complained to Islington Council about Lilian's practice of arranging that she would not perform same sex partnerships and she was ordered to perform such ceremonies. She claimed religious discrimination and the case went to an Employment Tribunal where she won her case, the ET said
"This is a case where there is a direct conflict between the legislative protection afforded to religion and belief and the legislative protection afforded to sexual orientation .... One set of rights cannot overrule the other set of rights"
The idea that Courts seek to balance conflicting rights is an old one in Law and it was therefore surprising that both the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal overturned the Tribunal decision. The Master of the Rolls (The Senior English Civil Judge) said
“Ms Ladele’s objection was based on her view of marriage, which was not a core part of her religion; and Islington’s requirement in no way prevented her from worshipping as she wished.”
The idea that a Civil Court could or should decide what is or is not a “core part” of a religion is startling and disturbing because on that basis one can almost ignore every form of Religious Discrimination on the basis that the belief is not a “core” part of the religion. In addition the remark that Ladelle was still free to worship, in her own time, is extraordinary in the context of a claim about religious discrimination in the workplace. The point is that she was faced with a choice of either leaving the job she had done without criticism for many years or acting contrary to her conscience.
Another phrase by the Master of the Rolls in Ladelle demonstrated complete inability to get to grips with the real issues in the case when he said
“It would have been no more acceptable for someone with Ms Ladele's views to refuse to perform civil partnerships than it would have been for a militant gay registrar to refuse to perform marriages between people who, for religious reasons, objected to homosexual relationships or civil partnerships.”
The real difficulty with this remark was that it fails to distinguish between dislike of the individual and moral complicity in a wrongful act. The Court also failed to really grapple with the idea of an employer making reasonable accommodations for an employees religious beliefs where such accommodation would not prejudice the work of the employer
The Ladelle case was firmly followed in the case of McFarlane v Relate where a Christian relationship counsellor asked not to have to counsel same sex couples re their sexual problems. In an attempt to appeal the decision Lord Carey (a former Archbishop of Canterbury) put in an Affidavit asking for understanding for Christian objection in these situations. This led to an extraordinary response from Lord Justice Lords who said that giving any legal protection to manifestations of religious belief would lead to a “Theocracy”. A Theocracy, of course, imposes its beliefs on others and it is in my view arguable that what the courts have done in Ladelle and Mcfarlane is much closer to the spirit of a Theocracy than the requests by these Claimants that their freedom of conscience should be respected.
In his rejection of Lord Careys concerns about the trend of anti-religious, and specifically anti-Christian decisions by Courts dealing with religious freedom cases Lord Justice Lords said
“Lord Carey’s observations are misplaced. The judges have never, so far as I know, sought to equate the condemnation by some Christians of homosexuality on religious grounds with homophobia, or to regard that position as “disreputable”. Nor have they likened Christians to bigots”
However only 2 months later in a decision in the Supreme Court HJ (Iran) regarding the rights of gay asylum seekers Lord Hope referred to
“The rampant homophobic teaching that right-wing evangelical Christian churches indulge in throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa”
WEARING A CROSS
The next major issue in religious freedom involved the wearing of a cross by an Employee of British Airways Nadia Eweida BA claimed that this cross was in breach of its uniform policy though it accepted that it permitted Muslims to wear Hijabs and Sikhs to wear Turbans and Kara bracelets. The Court decided that Eweida was not discriminated against because
“visible display of the cross [was not] a requirement of the Christian faith”
This decision is particularly hard to square with another decision where a school was told that it must allow a Sikh schoolgirl Sakira Singh to wear a Kara bracelet even though the court in that case accepted
“the claimant is not obliged by her religion to wear a Kara, it is clearly in her case [an] extremely important indication of her faith"
The logic of the decision in Eweida was followed in the case of Chaplin v Exeter NHS Trust where the Employment Tribunal said
“there is no mandatory requirement of the Christian faith that a Christian should wear a crucifix"
As with the case of Ladelle the Courts were assuming that they had the right to allocate levels of seriousness to religious belief and practice
FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS
Serious though these cases were a far more fundamental issue has arisen as to the extent to which religious organisations are going to be allowed to exercise freedom in their internal structures. The most serious example of this was the case of R v JFS School. Formerly known as the Jewish Free School JFS selected pupils who were designated as Jewish according to principles laid down by the Chief Rabbi in accordance with millennia old Jewish law under which a person is Jew either through conversion or through matrilineal descent.
The child 'R' in the case who had a Jewish father and non Jewish mother was therefore not classified as a Jew and so he was not eligible to go to JFS. His mother had actually converted to Judaism but via a reformed rather than an orthodox Synagogue and therefore her conversion was not recognised as valid by the Chief Rabbi who is Orthodox. The Supreme Court by a majority of 5-4 held that the rules applied by the Chief Rabbi were racist and therefore illegal.
Lady Hale in the main majority judgment said in para. 66
"Is the criterion adopted by the Chief Rabbi, and thus without question by the school, based upon the child’s ethnic origins? In my view, it clearly is. M was rejected because of his mother’s ethnic origins, which were Italian and Roman Catholic."
whilst Lord Rogers put the alternative view
“Lady Hale says that M was rejected because of his mother’s ethnic origins which were Italian and Roman Catholic. I respectfully disagree. His mother could have been as Italian in origin as Sophia Loren and as Roman Catholic as the Pope for all that the governors cared: the only thing that mattered was that she had not converted to Judaism under Orthodox auspices”
Whatever the legal merits of the decision in terms of theoretical law the principle behind the JFS decision is astonishing. What the Supreme Court in effect said was that it had the right to overrule the Chief Rabbi and to say that someone was a Jew when the Chief Rabbi said that he was not. I rhetorically asked in the Catholic Herald “what next. Will the Courts say that someone is a Catholic or indeed a Catholic Priest even though the Pope says they are not” The right of a religion (or indeed any organisation) to determine its own membership is fundamental to the survival of a free society and yet that fundamental principle seems to be being ignored by Court interpretations of Equality legislation
Another case involved the application of the Sexual Orientation Regulations (SOR's) to Catholic Adoption Agencies. There were over 20 Catholic charitable agencies attached to various Diocese many of which had operated for over 100 years providing a variety of social services including adoption services. They did not themselves arrange adoptions which remain the responsibility of local authorities but they were employed by local authorities to find prospective adoptive parents. They were particularly successful in finding parents for children who were hard to adopt often because of disability or for other reasons.
The problem for the agencies was that adoption services were covered by the SOR's and therefore the agencies would be obliged to accept same sex couples as potential adoptive parents contrary to Catholic teaching. Most of the agencies caved in to this and separated from the Church however two tried to carry on by amending their constitution to specifically state that adoption services would only be provided to heterosexual couples. Having such a clause would allow them to take advantage of a specific provision in the SOR's which permits Charities to discriminate if that is set out in their constitution
(NB This exemption is standard in all UK anti-discrimination legislation and, for example, permits charities to be formed which provide services only for women, people from a particular country or persons suffering from a specific disability).
The Charity Commission regulates charities and has to approve changes to their constitutions and it refused to allow the adoption agencies to change their constitution because “Discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is a serious matter “ What was of no importance was the religious nature of the Charity and no respect was shown to the fact that it had been formed by the Catholic Church which naturally wanted its own charity to act in accordance with Catholic teaching. No regard was paid to the idea of an organisation having the right to its own identity
THE FUTURE
How the future will develop for religious freedom in the UK in the future is difficult to tell. We are constantly being told that we are a secular society and at the same time that we are a multi-faith society and the conflict between those two positions has not yet been truly faced up to let alone resolved.
One new factor is the economic crisis which has already caused our new coalition government to look to charities and voluntary groups as having an increasingly important social role under the government policy of “the big society”. A fact that some government ministers are beginning to articulate is that the majority of charities and voluntary organisations have a religious basis or backing and there is a real question as to how far government is prepared to allow religious groups their own freedom of action.
In his speech in Westminster Hall on 17 September 2010 the Pope set out this challenge to Government when he said
“I am convinced that, within this country too, there are many areas in which the Church and the public authorities can work together for the good of citizens, in harmony with Britain’s long-standing tradition. For such cooperation to be possible, religious bodies – including institutions linked to the Catholic Church – need to be free to act in accordance with their own principles and specific convictions based upon the faith and the official teaching of the Church. In this way, such basic rights as religious freedom, freedom of conscience and freedom of association are guaranteed”
Whether government and courts will allow religious organisations this level of freedom remains an open question but the omens are not good
Thursday, 16 September 2010
And the Queen Wore Blue
On 8th September 2010 Geoffrey Robertson published in The Independent a section from his Book "The Case Against the Pope".
I had answered most of his points earlier in my Blogs on 9 April and 26 July but I noticed one quote from his book which is worthy of comment
He [ie Pope Benedict]will, it is said, emerge at Edinburgh from the papal plane resplendent in his red satin "head of state" robes ("trimmed with fur on top of a rochet, and wearing the embroidered papal stole") for his meeting with a fellow head of state – Queen Elizabeth II (who must wear black – only Catholic queens can meet the Pope in white)
Looking at the TV and Newspapers I notice that the Queen is not wearing Black she is in fact wearing a very fetching shade of light Blue. Speaking as a Barrister I can say that the rest of the book is as incorrect about the facts and the law as it is about the Queens wardrobe
For those who might want a second legal opinion similar to my own can I recommend the Blog of the European Journal of International Law
Finally one point specifically worthy of comment in Robertsons article where he says that Child Abuse by a Priest is WORSE than Child Abuse by parents which is a weird and frankly rather repellant opinion.
Robertson also makes some allegations based on alleged Catholic views of masturbation. I could reply to those points but I am happy to accept that Robertson is better qualified than myself to comment on that subject
I had answered most of his points earlier in my Blogs on 9 April and 26 July but I noticed one quote from his book which is worthy of comment
He [ie Pope Benedict]will, it is said, emerge at Edinburgh from the papal plane resplendent in his red satin "head of state" robes ("trimmed with fur on top of a rochet, and wearing the embroidered papal stole") for his meeting with a fellow head of state – Queen Elizabeth II (who must wear black – only Catholic queens can meet the Pope in white)
Looking at the TV and Newspapers I notice that the Queen is not wearing Black she is in fact wearing a very fetching shade of light Blue. Speaking as a Barrister I can say that the rest of the book is as incorrect about the facts and the law as it is about the Queens wardrobe
For those who might want a second legal opinion similar to my own can I recommend the Blog of the European Journal of International Law
Finally one point specifically worthy of comment in Robertsons article where he says that Child Abuse by a Priest is WORSE than Child Abuse by parents which is a weird and frankly rather repellant opinion.
Robertson also makes some allegations based on alleged Catholic views of masturbation. I could reply to those points but I am happy to accept that Robertson is better qualified than myself to comment on that subject
Thursday, 26 August 2010
American Atheists Inc v Utah Highway Patrol Association
The US 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has made a decision in the case of American Atheists, Inc v Utah Highway Patrol Association which overrules an earlier decision by a US District Court in 2007. The Appeals Court decision relies heavily on the US Supreme Court decision in the case of Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.
The case involved the "No Establishment Clause" in the Ist Amendment to the US Constitution and concerned memorial crosses erected by the Utah Highway Patrol Association [ a private Charity] in memory of Utah Highway Patrol Officers who have been killed on duty. In the earlier District Court hearing the Court had held that the cross was not an exclusively religious symbol and it depended on the circumstances in which it was used. (An interesting sideline mentioned in the judgment was the fact that in Utah the majority Christian faith is Mormonism and the Mormon Church does not use the Cross as part of its religious symbols or worship)
The Court of Appeals however decided that the Cross was an exclusively religious symbol and as such violated the No Establishment clause. They also held that the American Atheists had standing to bring the claim because
"Here, the individual named plaintiffs allege to have had “direct personal and unwelcome contact with the crosses.” Mr. Andrews, one of the named plaintiffs, also stated that he has “occasionally altered [his] travel route or [has] not stopped at a particular rest stop to avoid contact with the crosses.”
which provides an interesting variation on the usual suggestion that it is religious people who are oversensitive. The oversensitivity of the American Atheists in Utah seems to uncannily parallel the oversensitivity of the Atheist Italian in the European Court of Human Rights case of Lautsi v Italy
What I found peculiar in the 10th Circuits reasoning was that they found
"None of these families [ie the families of the deceased Highway Patrolmen] have ever objected to the use of the cross as a memorial or requested that the UHPA memorialize their loved one using a different symbol. However, because the UHPA exists to serve family members of highway patrolmen, the UHPA would provide another memorial symbol if requested by the family."
It seems to me that on any rational understanding of the Non Establishment clause the fact that other Non Christian symbols were available to any family that wanted it destroys the suggestion that the memorial crosses constitute an establishment of religion. If the family of a deceased Highway Patrol officer want his (or her) sacrifice to be memorialised by a cross what right does anyone else have to object ?
The case involved the "No Establishment Clause" in the Ist Amendment to the US Constitution and concerned memorial crosses erected by the Utah Highway Patrol Association [ a private Charity] in memory of Utah Highway Patrol Officers who have been killed on duty. In the earlier District Court hearing the Court had held that the cross was not an exclusively religious symbol and it depended on the circumstances in which it was used. (An interesting sideline mentioned in the judgment was the fact that in Utah the majority Christian faith is Mormonism and the Mormon Church does not use the Cross as part of its religious symbols or worship)
The Court of Appeals however decided that the Cross was an exclusively religious symbol and as such violated the No Establishment clause. They also held that the American Atheists had standing to bring the claim because
"Here, the individual named plaintiffs allege to have had “direct personal and unwelcome contact with the crosses.” Mr. Andrews, one of the named plaintiffs, also stated that he has “occasionally altered [his] travel route or [has] not stopped at a particular rest stop to avoid contact with the crosses.”
which provides an interesting variation on the usual suggestion that it is religious people who are oversensitive. The oversensitivity of the American Atheists in Utah seems to uncannily parallel the oversensitivity of the Atheist Italian in the European Court of Human Rights case of Lautsi v Italy
What I found peculiar in the 10th Circuits reasoning was that they found
"None of these families [ie the families of the deceased Highway Patrolmen] have ever objected to the use of the cross as a memorial or requested that the UHPA memorialize their loved one using a different symbol. However, because the UHPA exists to serve family members of highway patrolmen, the UHPA would provide another memorial symbol if requested by the family."
It seems to me that on any rational understanding of the Non Establishment clause the fact that other Non Christian symbols were available to any family that wanted it destroys the suggestion that the memorial crosses constitute an establishment of religion. If the family of a deceased Highway Patrol officer want his (or her) sacrifice to be memorialised by a cross what right does anyone else have to object ?
Monday, 23 August 2010
Catholic Care An attack on the idea of Charity Itself
The decision by the Charity Commission to refuse permission for the Leeds based Catholic Care Charity to amend its objects was depressingly predictable but what seems to have been overlooked in the acres of comment on the decision is the fact that the decision attacks the independence of the notion of charity itself
For those who have not followed the story closely back in 2007 Parliament passed the Sexual Orientation Regulations which prohibited discrimination against homosexuals/lesbians in the supply of goods and services, a Hotel for example cannot refuse to provide a double room to a same sex couple. However the SOR's apply to Charities and voluntary organisations as well as to businesses and therefore under the SOR's Catholic ,and other religious, Charities which dealt with finding adoptive parents were going to be legally obliged to deal with Same Sex couples who wanted to adopt.
Since Catholic belief is that same sex relationships are sinful ( a view shared by all mainstream Christian denominations alongside Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs ) this faced the Catholic Adoption Agencies with a moral dilemma. However the obvious solution lay in the use of reg 18 of the SOR's which does allow Charities to discriminate.
Reg 18 says
(1) Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for a person to provide benefits only to persons of a particular sexual orientation, if
(a)he acts in pursuance of a charitable instrument, and.
(b)the restriction of benefits to persons of that sexual orientation is imposed by reason of or on the grounds of the provisions of the charitable instrument
It should be noted at the outset that Reg 18 is not a "legal loophole" nor is it something specifically added to the SOR's so as to disadvantage homosexuals, the same provision applies in all the other varieties of Anti-discrimination law and allows Charities to obtain exemptions from those laws. This is is based on the recognition that people can set up Charities for a wide range of reasons.
For example lets say a successfull Black businessman wanted to set up a fund to give scholarships to poor black youths or a Scottish businessman wanted to set up a charity to help homeless Scots in London; such Charities would be racially discriminatory but that discrimination would be allowed under Race Discrimination legislation. Similarly a Charity helping battered women would discriminate on the grounds of sex and a Charity helping the deaf would discriminate on the grounds of disablity but in both cases that discrimination would be legal.
Catholic Care therefore decided to amend its Charitable objects to add the following clause
"The Charity shall only provide adoption services to heterosexuals and such services to heterosexuals will only be provided in accordance with the tenets of the Church. For the avoidance of doubt the Roman Catholic Bishop of Leeds from time to time shall be the arbiter of whether such services and the manner of their provision fall within the tenets of the Church."
I have commented on other occasions that in my opinion the drafting of this clause was fundamentally flawed because it was explicitly and obviously discriminatory and it only dealt with adoption services. In my view the Charity should have applied to amend its constitution to read something like the following
"The Charity shall provide its services in accordance with the tenets of the Church. For the avoidance of doubt the Roman Catholic Bishop of Leeds from time to time shall be the arbiter of whether such services and the manner of their provision fall within the tenets of the Church."
That said the proposed change was, in my view, within the ambit of reg 18
The Charity Commission rejected the proposed amendment on 18th November 2008
The Charity appealed to the Charity Tribunal which rejected the appeal on 1st June 2009
The Charity appealed to the High Court which in decision [2010] EWHC 520 (Ch) dated 17 March 2010 ordered the Charity Commission to reconsider its decision
The Charity Commission reconsidered and on the 21st July 2010 issued its decision which was formally announced on 18th August namely that it had reached exactly the same decision it made before
The Charity Commission made its decision knowing that the consequence was that Catholic Care would stop offering its adoption services and as such is notable for its lack of consistency of logic when it says
"The interests of children are paramount - the courts have found that it is in the interests of children waiting to be adopted that the pool from which prospective parents are drawn is as wide as possible.
Local authority evidence suggests that even if the charity were to close its adoption service, children who would have been placed through the charity are likely to be placed through other agencies"
Clearly if the closure of Catholic Care adoption services would not reduce the pool of adoptive parents then its retention would not either so what exactly was the harm in permitting Catholic Care to continue , where is the sense of proportionality which was the main thrust of the High Court decision. More importantly by saying that it cannot allow Catholic Care to "discriminate" the Charity Commission has in effect rendered reg 18 meaningless and made its views about discrimination take precedence over the law as passed by Parliament.
Also the Commission has dealt a blow to the idea of Charity itself which is the free giving by individuals and organisations to help others. If the Catholic Church (or any other organisation or individual) wants to spend its own money in any way it pleases to help others why should an unelected quango, or indeed an elected Government interfere ? If individuals want to give money to organisations that arrange adoption services only for heterosexuals, or only for homosexuals, or disabled people or black people or white people what right does the government have to interfere with that choice ?
The provision of adoption services is a good thing in itself and a charitable purpose and for that reason alone should surely have been permitted even if the Commission felt that the services were provided on too limited a basis. The Commission seems to have regarded Charitable status as a favour granted by itself rather than as a good thing to be encouraged. This decision by the Charity Commission has, quite rightly been criticised as an attack on religious freedom but I would go further it is an attack on freedom itself. If individuals, churches and organisations do not even have the right to choose how to give away their own money then freedom itself ceases to exist.
We are increasingly hearing the phrase "soft totalitarianism" and this decision is an example of that totalitarianism because it has no respect for the independence of charities or the independent role of private organisations as part of civil society. Since when has it been the role or right of government to say that "we will not allow you to use you own money to do good unless you use it in a way we agree with".
For those who have not followed the story closely back in 2007 Parliament passed the Sexual Orientation Regulations which prohibited discrimination against homosexuals/lesbians in the supply of goods and services, a Hotel for example cannot refuse to provide a double room to a same sex couple. However the SOR's apply to Charities and voluntary organisations as well as to businesses and therefore under the SOR's Catholic ,and other religious, Charities which dealt with finding adoptive parents were going to be legally obliged to deal with Same Sex couples who wanted to adopt.
Since Catholic belief is that same sex relationships are sinful ( a view shared by all mainstream Christian denominations alongside Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs ) this faced the Catholic Adoption Agencies with a moral dilemma. However the obvious solution lay in the use of reg 18 of the SOR's which does allow Charities to discriminate.
Reg 18 says
(1) Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for a person to provide benefits only to persons of a particular sexual orientation, if
(a)he acts in pursuance of a charitable instrument, and.
(b)the restriction of benefits to persons of that sexual orientation is imposed by reason of or on the grounds of the provisions of the charitable instrument
It should be noted at the outset that Reg 18 is not a "legal loophole" nor is it something specifically added to the SOR's so as to disadvantage homosexuals, the same provision applies in all the other varieties of Anti-discrimination law and allows Charities to obtain exemptions from those laws. This is is based on the recognition that people can set up Charities for a wide range of reasons.
For example lets say a successfull Black businessman wanted to set up a fund to give scholarships to poor black youths or a Scottish businessman wanted to set up a charity to help homeless Scots in London; such Charities would be racially discriminatory but that discrimination would be allowed under Race Discrimination legislation. Similarly a Charity helping battered women would discriminate on the grounds of sex and a Charity helping the deaf would discriminate on the grounds of disablity but in both cases that discrimination would be legal.
Catholic Care therefore decided to amend its Charitable objects to add the following clause
"The Charity shall only provide adoption services to heterosexuals and such services to heterosexuals will only be provided in accordance with the tenets of the Church. For the avoidance of doubt the Roman Catholic Bishop of Leeds from time to time shall be the arbiter of whether such services and the manner of their provision fall within the tenets of the Church."
I have commented on other occasions that in my opinion the drafting of this clause was fundamentally flawed because it was explicitly and obviously discriminatory and it only dealt with adoption services. In my view the Charity should have applied to amend its constitution to read something like the following
"The Charity shall provide its services in accordance with the tenets of the Church. For the avoidance of doubt the Roman Catholic Bishop of Leeds from time to time shall be the arbiter of whether such services and the manner of their provision fall within the tenets of the Church."
That said the proposed change was, in my view, within the ambit of reg 18
The Charity Commission rejected the proposed amendment on 18th November 2008
The Charity appealed to the Charity Tribunal which rejected the appeal on 1st June 2009
The Charity appealed to the High Court which in decision [2010] EWHC 520 (Ch) dated 17 March 2010 ordered the Charity Commission to reconsider its decision
The Charity Commission reconsidered and on the 21st July 2010 issued its decision which was formally announced on 18th August namely that it had reached exactly the same decision it made before
The Charity Commission made its decision knowing that the consequence was that Catholic Care would stop offering its adoption services and as such is notable for its lack of consistency of logic when it says
"The interests of children are paramount - the courts have found that it is in the interests of children waiting to be adopted that the pool from which prospective parents are drawn is as wide as possible.
Local authority evidence suggests that even if the charity were to close its adoption service, children who would have been placed through the charity are likely to be placed through other agencies"
Clearly if the closure of Catholic Care adoption services would not reduce the pool of adoptive parents then its retention would not either so what exactly was the harm in permitting Catholic Care to continue , where is the sense of proportionality which was the main thrust of the High Court decision. More importantly by saying that it cannot allow Catholic Care to "discriminate" the Charity Commission has in effect rendered reg 18 meaningless and made its views about discrimination take precedence over the law as passed by Parliament.
Also the Commission has dealt a blow to the idea of Charity itself which is the free giving by individuals and organisations to help others. If the Catholic Church (or any other organisation or individual) wants to spend its own money in any way it pleases to help others why should an unelected quango, or indeed an elected Government interfere ? If individuals want to give money to organisations that arrange adoption services only for heterosexuals, or only for homosexuals, or disabled people or black people or white people what right does the government have to interfere with that choice ?
The provision of adoption services is a good thing in itself and a charitable purpose and for that reason alone should surely have been permitted even if the Commission felt that the services were provided on too limited a basis. The Commission seems to have regarded Charitable status as a favour granted by itself rather than as a good thing to be encouraged. This decision by the Charity Commission has, quite rightly been criticised as an attack on religious freedom but I would go further it is an attack on freedom itself. If individuals, churches and organisations do not even have the right to choose how to give away their own money then freedom itself ceases to exist.
We are increasingly hearing the phrase "soft totalitarianism" and this decision is an example of that totalitarianism because it has no respect for the independence of charities or the independent role of private organisations as part of civil society. Since when has it been the role or right of government to say that "we will not allow you to use you own money to do good unless you use it in a way we agree with".
Tuesday, 10 August 2010
Doe v Holy See - Update
My earlier Blog Doe v Holy See - Not as Important as it appears has been supported by the decision today to withdraw three Civil Claims against the Holy See brought in Kentucky. As I mentioned the main point of the Doe case was that it rejected the idea that Catholic Diocese or Orders were "agents or instrumentalities" of the Holy See and it also explicitly accepted that because the Holy See is recognised as Foreign State by the US Government it therefore is a Foreign State under US Law.
Though the News Stories mention that the Oregon claims are still proceeding I suspect that the lawyers in that case will recognise that they will have an insurmountable problem trying to prove that Priests in America are "employees" of the Vatican. Incidentally the American Doe case does demonstrate that Geoffrey Robinson was talking legal rubbish when he suggested that the Vatican was not a State in International Law which is what I said at the time
Though the News Stories mention that the Oregon claims are still proceeding I suspect that the lawyers in that case will recognise that they will have an insurmountable problem trying to prove that Priests in America are "employees" of the Vatican. Incidentally the American Doe case does demonstrate that Geoffrey Robinson was talking legal rubbish when he suggested that the Vatican was not a State in International Law which is what I said at the time
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