US Supreme Court - Same Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom

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 Continuing my analysis of the US Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges I am going to look at how the decison and the dissenting judgments deal with the implications of the judgment so far as Religious Freedom is concerned

Under the 1st Amendment to the US Constitution the "free exercise" of religion is explicitly protected
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"

The question of a possible conflict between Religious Rights and the newly discovered (invented !) "right" to same-sex marriage was touched on in the majority judgment at P27
"Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing samesex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex. "

This reassurance is however given short shrift in the dissenting judgments

Roberts P27 
"Today’s decision,for example, creates serious questions about religious liberty. Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise religion is—unlike the right imagined by the majority—actually spelled out in the Constitution. Amdt. 1. Respect for sincere religious conviction has led voters and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sex marriage democratically to include accommodations for religious practice. The majority’s decision imposing samesex marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommodations. The majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue to “advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. Ante, at 27. The First Amendment guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion. Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses. Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—when, for example, a religious college provides married student housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency declines to place children with same-sex married couples. Indeed, the Solicitor General candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religious institutions would be in question if they opposed same-sex marriage. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 36–38. There is little doubt that these and similar questions will soon be before this Court. Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today"

Thomas P14 
"Aside from undermining the political processes that protect our liberty, the majority’s decision threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect.....In our society, marriage is not simply a governmental institution; it is a religious institution as well. Id., at 7. Today’s decision might change the former, but it cannot change the latter. It appears all but inevitable that the two will come into conflict, particularly as individuals and churches are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex couples. The majority appears unmoved by that inevitability. It makes only a weak gesture toward religious liberty in a single paragraph, ante, at 27. And even that gesture indicates a misunderstanding of religious liberty in our Nation’s tradition. Religious liberty is about more than just the protection for “religious organizations and persons . . . as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.” Ibid.
Religious liberty is about freedom of action in matters of religion generally, and the scope of that liberty is directly correlated to the civil restraints placed upon religious practice. Although our Constitution provides some protection against such governmental restrictions on religious practices, the People have long elected to afford broader protections than this Court’s constitutional precedents mandate. Had the majority allowed the definition of marriage to be left to the political process—as the Constitution
requires—the People could have considered the religious liberty implications of deviating from the traditional definition as part of their deliberative process. Instead, the majority’s decision short-circuits that process, with potentially ruinous consequences for religious liberty"

Alito P7 
"Perhaps recognizing how its reasoning may be used, the majority attempts, toward the end of its opinion, to reassure those who oppose same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience will be protected. Ante, at 26–27. We will soon see whether this proves to be true. I assume that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.
The system of federalism established by our Constitution provides a way for people with different beliefs to live together in a single nation. If the issue of same-sex marriage had been left to the people of the States, it is likely that some States would recognize same-sex marriage and others would not. It is also possible that some States would tie recognition to protection for conscience rights. The majority today makes that impossible. By imposing its own views on the entire country, the majority facilitates the marginalization of the many Americans who have traditional ideas"

So what are the consequences of the decision for Religous Freedom in the US since, as the dissenters have pointed out, the consequences are far greater than they would be if Same-Sex Marriage had become law through legislative chage rather than by becoming a, hitherto unseen, Constitutional "right".  Legislation can be fine tuned and amended in a way that an unwritten "right" cannot be.  The judgment creating the "right" to same-sex marriage sets up a conflict of "rights" namely the explicit protection of religious rights set out in the 1st Amendment as against the, fairly unspecified, "right" to same-sex marriage which was "discovered" by the 5 Judges who gave the Obergefell decision.  A conflict of rights is a recipe for years of expensive and acrimonious litigation because how can the Courts or legislatures protect the Constitutional rights of a Religious Organisation that actively disagrees with another Constitutional Right?

In Bob Jones University v. United States case 461 U.S. 574 (1983) the US Supreme Court decided that the Ist Amendment did not prevent the US Government removing the religious tax exemptions given to the religious Bob Jones University because the University prohibited Inter-racial dating.  It would be therefore be a relatively easy and lawful step for tax exemptions to be similarly removed from religions that did not endorse same-sex relationships; as Chief Justice Roberts in P27 of his dissent pointed out that this possibility has already been considered and accepted by the US Government.

A more sinister, but equally possible, secenario would be the passing of legislation seizing the property of Religious Organisations which disagree with same-sex marriage.  This could be legally justified on the basis that the teachings and practices of such religions opposed a "right" enshrined within the US Constitution.  

In the 19th Century when the Mormon Church practiced Polygamy the US Congress passed a series of increasingly draconian anti Mormon acts culminating in the 1887 Edmunds-Tucker Act which dissolved the MormonChurch and directed the confiscation by the federal government of all church properties. The legality and constitutionality of this act was endorsed by the US Supreme Court in Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States 136 U.S. 1 (1890). on the basis that the beliefs and practices of the Mormon Church were incompatible with US Law

Could the same thing happen to Religious Organisations which disagree with same-sex marriage ?  The legal precedents are there and certainly on the part of same-sex marriage advocates the will is there to attack and if possible destroy religion, in particular Christianity. Religions in the US are therefore facing a dangerous future where their freedom is far from guaranteed. 

US Supreme Court - Same Sex Marriage Judgment

In the case of Obergefell v. Hodges the US Supreme Court has decided that the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution obliges all 50 States to recognise and licence Same-Sex Marriages.  

The decision was by a majority of 5 - 4 so a very close split for such a fundamental decision with implications that go far beyond the issue of Same-Sex marriage itself.  The majority decision was given by Justice Kennedy, supported by Ginsberg J, Breyer J, Sotomayor J, and Kagan J.  There was a dissenting Judgment given by Chief Justice Roberts, supported by Scalia J and Thomas J,  a dissent by Justice Scalia J supported by Thomas J, another by Thomas J supported by Scalia J and last, but very definately not least a dissent by Alito J supported by Scalia J and Thomas J.

There are specific references in all these judgments regarding its implications for Religious Freedom which I will deal with in a separate Blog but from my point of view the dissenting judgments are more intellectually and legally coherent than the warm words, feel good, fatuousness of the majority Judgment so I will concentrate on them.  

The dissenting judgment by Thomas J is particularly interesting in that he attacks what is in effect the new notion of "rights" within western society namely a demand that the Government and State "do something" rather than the historical view that "liberty" involves freedom "from" the state "doing something" and he points out that the decision of the Court is actually subversive and undermining of "Liberty" and "freedom" which are (or should be) the cornerstones of the US Constitution. 

P7: "In the American legal tradition, liberty has long been understood as individual freedom from governmental action, not as a right to a particular governmental entitlement. .....P8 “[T]he common idea of liberty is merely negative, and is only the absence of restraint.” ....... "Petitioners cannot claim, under the most plausible definition of “liberty,” that they have been imprisoned or physically restrained by the States for participating in same-sex relationships. To the contrary, they have been able to cohabitate and raise their children in peace" ........P10 "Petitioners claim that as a matter of “liberty,” they are entitled to access privileges and benefits that exist solely because of the government. They want, for example, to receive the State’s imprimatur on their marriages—on state issued marriage licenses, death certificates, or other official forms. And they want to receive various monetary benefits, including reduced inheritance taxes upon the death of a spouse, compensation if a spouse dies as a result of a work-related injury, or loss of consortium damages in tort suits. But receiving governmental recognition and benefits has nothing to do with any understanding of “liberty” that the Framers [of the US Constitution] would have recognized."

The Dissent by Scalia J is astonishing in the vehemence of his language excoriating 5 of his colleagues.  Like all of the dissenters he makes it clear that his objection is not to Same-Sex Marriage per se, his objection is to Same-Sex marriage being imposed on the entire United States by means of Judicial Decree

P1"The substance of today’s decree is not of immense personal importance to me. The law can recognize as marriage whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements it wishes, and can accord them favorable civil consequences, from tax treatment to rights of inheritance.Those civil consequences—and the public approval that conferring the name of marriage evidences—can perhaps have adverse social effects, but no more adverse than the effects of many other controversial laws. So it is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage. It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court"....... 

He contrasts the difference between a new idea, such as same-sex marriage coming into force as a result of legislative debate rather than through Judicial diktat P2" Until the courts put a stop to it, public debate over same-sex marriage displayed American democracy at its best. Individuals on both sides of the issue passionately, but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citizens to accept their views. Americans considered the arguments and put the question to a vote. The electorates of 11 States, either directly or through their representatives, chose to expand the traditional definition of marriage. Many more decided not to. Win or lose, advocates for both sides continued pressing their cases, secure in the knowledge that an electoral loss can be negated by a later electoral win. That is exactly how our system of government is supposed to work." .....P4"But the Court ends this debate, in an opinion lacking even a thin veneer of law. Buried beneath the mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable passages of the opinion is a candid and startling assertion: No matter what it was the People ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment protects those rights that the Judiciary, in its “reasoned judgment,” thinks the Fourteenth Amendment ought to protect".........P6"The five Justices who compose today’s majority are entirely comfortable concluding that every State violated the Constitution for all of the 135 years between the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification and Massachusetts’ permitting of same-sex marriages in 2003. They have discovered in the Fourteenth Amendment a “fundamental right” overlooked by every person alive at the time of ratification, and almost everyone else in the time since."

Alito J makes a similar point regarding the fact that the Court is imposing on America a judgment which in a Democracy should be made by the elected representatives of the people.  
P6" The Members of this Court have the authority and the responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. Thus, if the Constitution contained a provision guaranteeing the right to marry a person of the same sex, it would be our duty to enforce that right. But the Constitution simply does not speak to the issue of same-sex marriage. In our system of government, ultimate sovereignty rests with the people, and the people have the right to control their own destiny. Any change on a question so fundamental should be made by the people through their elected officials.”

And he points out the long term implications of the way inwhich this decision has been arrived at and the future role of the Supreme Court P7"Today’s decision will also have a fundamental effect on this Court and its ability to uphold the rule of law. If a bare majority of Justices can invent a new right and impose that right on the rest of the country, the only real limit on what future majorities will be able to do is their own sense of what those with political power and cultural influence are willing to tolerate. Even enthusiastic supporters of same-sex marriage should worry about the scope of the power that today’s majority claims."

The Dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, is more restrained, as one might expect but for that reason is even more damning

P2 "Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be"....."Today, however, the Court takes the extraordinary step of ordering every State to license and recognize same-sex marriage. Many people will rejoice at this decision, and I begrudge none their celebration. But for those who believe in a government of laws, not of men, the majority’s approach is deeply disheartening. Supporters of same-sex marriage have achieved considerable success persuading their fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today. Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law. Stealing this issue from the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept. The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment." ......

P3 "Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether, in my judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to include same-sex couples. It is instead about whether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest with the people acting through their elected representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them to resolve legal disputes according to law." 

Interestingly Chief Justice Roberts goes on to compare this decision by the Supreme Court to the infamous "Dred Scott" case where the decision of the then, pro-slavery, Supreme Court to extend the rights of slave owners throughout the entire United States including the Free States was a major factor leading to the subsequent American Civil War.

P11 "The need for restraint in administering the strong medicine of substantive due process is a lesson this Court has learned the hard way. The Court first applied substantive due process to strike down a statute in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). There the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise on the ground that legislation restricting the institution of slavery violated the implied rights of slaveholders. The Court relied on its own conception of liberty and property in doing so. ....... Dred Scott’s holding was overruled on the battlefields of
the Civil War and by constitutional amendment after Appomattox,"

The Chief Justice also dealt with the probability that the logic of the decision by the Supreme Court would lead to legal cases demanding Polygamy, Polyandry and Plural Marriage In terms of American legal history this was not a merely theoretical suggestion.  The legal definition of Marriage as being between 2 persons was laid down in the United States by the 1878 case of Reynolds v USA 98 U.S. 145 wchich involved the legality of Mormon Polygamy.  (See my Blog for 1 August 2013 on Mormon Polygamy and the Law)

P20 "One immediate question invited by the majority’s position is whether States may retain the definition of marriage as a union of two people. Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (Utah 2013), appeal pending, No. 14-4117 (CA10). Although the majority randomly inserts the adjective “two” in various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-woman element may not. Indeed, from the standpoint of history and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures around the world. If the majority is willing to take the big leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the shorter one."

 And he, like the other dissenters gives a warning regarding the long term implications of the Courts decision

"P22 "The majority’s understanding of due process lays out a tantalizing vision of the future for Members of this Court: If an unvarying social institution enduring over all of recorded history cannot inhibit judicial policymaking, what can? But this approach is dangerous for the rule of law. The purpose of insisting that implied fundamental rights have roots in the history and tradition of our people is to ensure that when unelected judges strike down democratically enacted laws, they do so based on something more than their own beliefs. The Court today not only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but actively repudiates it, preferring to live only in the heady days of the here and now"

Or as Scalia puts it more pointedly
P5"A system of government that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy."  
to which I, as a British rather than an American citizen, can only say "hear hear"

Ashers Bakery and the "Gay Cake"

                                

Judgment has been delivered in the Northern Ireland case of  Lee v Ashers Baking Company [2015] NICty 2 (Court summary HERE).  The case considered whether it was illegal for Ashers to refuse to bake a cake which carried a logo saying "support gay marriage" along with a picture of Bert and Ernie from Sesame Street, and the logo of the organisation  'Queerspace'.  More background facts available HERE and a picture below of what Mr Lee wanted putting on the cake

Unlike many similar cases which involved Bakeries refusing to make a cake for a Same-Sex Marriage reception this case involved a Bakery being asked to bake a cake which explicitly endorsed the campaign to legalise Same-Sex Marriage in Northern Ireland.  The Company was run by a family who are devout Christians and who believe that Marriage is between a Man and a Woman

The case revolved around 2 separate legal issues namely whether the refusal to make the cake constituted Discrimination on the grounds of Sexual Orientation contrary to the  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 and whether it constituted unlawful discrimination on the grounds of Political Opinion contrary to the  Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998.

Northern Ireland is unique in the UK for in making discrimination on the grounds of political opinion explicitly unlawful and this arises from the long history of sectarian division in Northern Ireland where religion, nationality and political opinion were so often synonymous with British/Unionist/Protestant identity facing Irish/Republican/Catholic identity.

Surprisingly in this case the Judge held that the refusal of Ashers to bake the cake constituted direct discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation simply on the basis that the buyer, a Mr Lee, happened to be Gay even though many supporters of Gay Marriage are heterosexual and similarly many Gay people are opposed to Gay Marriage.  As is usual in these cases the Judge paid lip service to the Ashers rights to Religious Freedom under Article 9 and then stated that the law overode those rights

Somewhat less surprisingly the Judge also decided that the refusal constituted discrimination on the grounds of political opinion.  Damages were assessed as a nominal figure of £500.

The case will undoubtedly be appealed but what does emerge from it is the complete intolerance of the "Equality" industry and the way in which Equality Law is being used to destroy individual freedom including the freedom of a Bakery company to decide what products it wants to make.  

We in Britain have just been celebrating the 70th anniversary of our victory in WW2 but frankly what are we celebrating ?, 'Freedom', but not if you run a Bakery it would seem.  

Equality and Human Rights Commission Report

The Equality and Human Rights Commission has issued a Report on Religion or belief in the workplace and service delivery which is an analysis of a consultation regarding the operation of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to protecting (or not protecting) expressions of Religion and Belief especially in the workplace

I was asked to speak on the subject to BBC Radio Merseyside this morning and you can hear my contribution HERE (I am at 01:06:00  the contribution from the EHRC is at 00:06:00 )

My main point which I have made before is that the real problem is the fact that people increasingly look for reasons to be 'offended' rather than adopting a 'live and let live' attitude to others.  

The EHRC consultation elicited responses from 2,500 people with the largest number of responses coming from Christians from a number of denominations. The EHRC website says that

"Positive experiences included respondents describing workplaces with an inclusive environment in which employees and employers were able to discuss openly the impact of religion or belief on employees or customers. Some respondents of different religions also reported they were easily able to take time off to celebrate religious holidays.

Some employees or service users stated that they had experienced no or few negative issues in their workplace or in receiving a service which they attributed to the view of employers or service providers that religion or belief was a private matter and should not be discussed in the workplace or the service.

Some employees and students stated that they had encountered hostile and unwelcoming environments in relation to the holding, or not holding, of a religion or belief. The issues raised concerned the recruitment process, working conditions, including the wearing of religious clothing or symbols, promotion and progression, and time off work for religious holidays and holy days. Some reported that particular beliefs were mocked or dismissed in the workplace or classroom, or criticised unwelcome 'preaching' or proselytising, or the expression of hurtful or derogatory remarks aimed at particular groups.

Employees and employers reported that requests relating to religion or belief issues were not always fairly dealt with in the workplace and some called for better guidance on how to achieve this.

Many participants were concerned about the right balance between the freedom to express religious views and the right of others to be free from discrimination or harassment. Specific issues raised included conscientious objection in relation to marriage of same sex couples and how to protect employees from harassment and discrimination by staff, customers or service users with a religion. There was a marked divergence of opinion about when it was desirable and appropriate to discuss religious beliefs with service users during the delivery of a service.

A group of service providers with a religious ethos expressed concerns about reductions in funding opportunities from the public and private sectors.

Some participants viewed the current equality and human rights legal framework relating to religion or belief favourably, arguing that it provided a single robust framework to deal with discrimination and equality. Others were broadly favourable, but felt a pluralistic approach had not yet gone far enough. A third group viewed the law negatively, with some Christian employers, service users and providers considering that Christianity had lost status as a result of the legal framework. "

My own view is that I do not expect to see anything positive coming from the EHRC which so far as I am concerned is simply a waste of the taxpayers money. It is a paradox of EHRC like so many other organisations in modern Britain that is considers itself a beacon of liberal tolerance but that liberal tolerance is only extended to similarly minded tolerant liberals.   

Call The Midwife I want an Abortion ! - 4

In an attempt to try to derive some good from the Supreme Court decision in  Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68  the comments of Lady Hale in paras 23 and 24 are worth noting 

23: There was some discussion, at an earlier stage in these proceedings, of the relevance of the petitioners' rights under article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This protects the "right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion," including the freedom "to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance". It is our duty, under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, to read and give effect to legislation, whenever it was passed, in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights, so far as it is possible to do so. However, the article 9 right is a qualified right, which may be subject to "such limitations as are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". Refusing for religious reasons to perform some of the duties of a job is likely (following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Eweida v United Kingdom ((2013) 57 EHRR 8) to be held to be a manifestation of a religious belief. There would remain difficult questions of whether the restrictions placed by the employers upon the exercise of that right were a proportionate means of pursuing a legitimate aim. The answers would be context specific and would not necessarily point to either a wide or a narrow reading of section 4 of the 1967 Act.


24: The better course, therefore, is for this court to decide what that section means according to the ordinary principles of statutory construction. That will then set a limit to what an employer may lawfully require of his employees. But a state employer has also to respect his employees' Convention rights. And the Equality Act 2010 requires that any employer refrain from direct or unjustified indirect discrimination against his employees on the ground of their religion or belief. So, even if not protected by the conscience clause in section 4, the petitioners may still claim that, either under the Human Rights Act or under the Equality Act, their employers should have made reasonable adjustments to the requirements of the job in order to cater for their religious beliefs. This will, to some extent at least, depend upon issues of practicability which are much better suited to resolution in the employment tribunal proceedings (currently sisted pending the resolution of this case) than in judicial review proceedings such as these.

This does give Supreme Court approval to an argument that I have successfully used to defend pro-life medics being pressurised to assist with Abortion services even if they do not "participate" in the narrow sense in which that word has been interpreted by the Supreme Court.  In a Blog on 12 August 2011 "Abortion and the Equality Act" I discussed my use of the Equality Act with the pro-life position being put forward either as a religious or a philosophical belief ( as I have frequently mentioned in the past pro-life views are not restricted to religious believers, it is quite possible to be an Atheist and pro-life )

In an ET1 (Employment Tribunal Claim Form) drafted by myself on behalf of a pro-life employee in the NHS I relied on Article 9 and s10 as follows

"The claimant is a member of the Roman Catholic Religion.  She has both a religious and a personal philosophical belief that human life begins at conception and that Abortion is the killing of an innocent human life and is harmful both to the unborn child and to the mother of that unborn child. This is a belief which is compatible with human dignity and worthy of respect in a civilised society and as such it is protected under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Human Rights and under section 10(1) and 10(2) of the Equality Act 2010."

The cases I have been involved in have however all been resolved without litigation and therefore it is still unclear how far the Equality Act will be effective in protecting pro-life medics and Lady Hales remarks do seem to be an encouragement to litigation which will be expensive and uncertain for all concerned.  

Personally I would have preferred the simpler and more realistic solution of the Supreme Court giving a broad reading  to the Conscientious Objection clause in s4 of the Abortion Act 1967.  However since that has not happened pro-life medics and lawyers such as myself will now have to look increasingly to the Equality Act and the Human Rights Act in order to protect conscience and avoid participation in Abortion

Call the Midwife I want an Abortion ! - 3

The Supreme Court has issued its decision in the case of  Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 which was an Appeal from the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session [2013] ScotCS CSIH_36 itself an Appeal from the earlier Outer House decision [2012] ScotCS CSOH_32.   

I have Blogged about the cases in 2012 and 2013.  In brief Ms Doogan and Ms Wood are experienced senior Midwives who worked in a supervisory capacity in the Labour Ward of their Hospital. Due to changes in Hospital routines etc Abortions began to be performed in the Labour ward and this change put the two midwives in a moral and legal dilemma that eventually led to the Supreme Court. 

They objected to Abortion on Religious Grounds (they are Roman Catholics and the Catholic position on Abortion is pretty unambiguous) and sought to rely on the Conscientious Objection clause in s4(1) Abortion Act 1967 which says.

"no person shall be under any duty whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection"

It is worth pointing out that the conscientious objection clause is not restricted to believers in religion, a Secular Pro-Life person is entitled to rely on s4(1) just as much as a religious person. 

The problem that the two Midwives had was that the Hospital did not accept that s4(1) covered their supervisory functions but insisted that it only applied to direct involvement in the physical act of Abortion and the legal case at all Courts has revolved around the question of what "participate in any treatment" actually meant. 

The Supreme Court found against the Midwives and the Judgment was, ironically, delivered by Lady Hale.  I say "ironically" because on 13th June 2014 Lady Hale gave a speech to the Law Society of Ireland where she said 
"I am not sure that our law has yet found a reasonable accommodation of all these different strands [of religious freedom and conscientious objection]"

One thing is clear from the Doogan Judgment namely that the Supreme Court did not even try to find a "reasonable accomodation" and instead went out of its way to emasculate and limit the Conscience Clause in s4.  The Court in para 37 of its judgment accepted that the word "participate" can have a narrow or a wider meaning and then in para 38 plumped for the narrow meaning

37: The more difficult question is what is meant by "to participate in" the course of treatment in question. The employers accept that it could have a broad or a narrow meaning. On any view, it would not cover things done before the course of treatment began, such as making the booking before the first drug is administered. But a broad meaning might cover things done in connection with that treatment after it had begun, such as assigning staff to work with the patient, supervising and supporting such staff, and keeping a managerial eye on all the patients in the ward, including any undergoing a termination. A narrow meaning would restrict it to "actually taking part", that is actually performing the tasks involved in the course of treatment.

38: In my view, the narrow meaning is more likely to have been in the contemplation of Parliament when the Act was passed. The focus of section 4 is on the acts made lawful by section 1. It is unlikely that, in enacting the conscience clause, Parliament had in mind the host of ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks that might be associated with those acts. Parliament will not have had in mind the hospital managers who decide to offer an abortion service, the administrators who decide how best that service can be organised within the hospital (for example, by assigning some terminations to the Labour Ward, some to the Fetal Medicine Unit and some to the Gynaecology Ward), the caterers who provide the patients with food, and the cleaners who provide them with a safe and hygienic environment. Yet all may be said in some way to be facilitating the carrying out of the treatment involved. The managerial and supervisory tasks carried out by the Labour Ward Co-ordinators are closer to these roles than they are to the role of providing the treatment which brings about the termination of the pregnancy. "Participate" in my view means taking part in a "hands-on" capacity.

My first objection to this is that there is absolutely no factual or legal basis on for the Court to decide that the "narrow interpretation" is more likely to have been "in the contemplation of Parliament". There appears to have been no reference made to the Parliamentary Debates as is allowed by the case of Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 and which would have revealed that the Abortion Act was only passed because of the conscience clause in s4 and assurances that there would be no compulsion regarding participation in Abortion 

There seemed no recognition that the  job of a Labour Ward Co-ordinator required a medical qualification and was carried out by these Midwives in their capacity as qualified Midwives so the comparison Lady Hale makes with cleaners etc is simply fatuous 

More worryingly the Judgment deals with 2 issues relating to Abortion but which were not part of the issues before the Court

In para 36 Lady Hale says that the Conscience Clause provisions in s4 do not cover a Doctor who is asked to sign an authorisation form to legalise an Abortion 

"In Janaway [1989] AC 537, 572 Lord Keith pointed out that such an interpretation would not cover the doctors forming the opinions required by section 1 and signing the certificates to that effect" 

This is actually a complete misrepresentation of Lord Keiths remarks in Janaway where after discussing whether s4 applied to Doctors Certificates he said (very correctly) 

"I do not think it appropriate to express any opinion on the matter."

I rather wish Lady Hale had accepted the same degree of proper Judicial restraint in commenting on matters which were not specifically part of the issues in the case especially having regard to the fact that Doctors Organisations were not represented at the Supreme Court case and had not been forewarned that legal decisions might be made relating to them so that they could make representations if they wished.

In para 40 she says

"it is a feature of conscience clauses generally within the health care profession that the conscientious objector be under an obligation to refer the case to a professional who does not share that objection. This is a necessary corollary of the professional's duty of care towards the patient. Once she has assumed care of the patient, she needs a good reason for failing to provide that care. But when conscientious objection is the reason, another health care professional should be found who does not share the objection."

Once again this was not an issue in the case, Doctors and Nurses Organisations were not forewarned that judgments might be made on this point so that they could be represented and make representations if they wished.  Also it is reading something into an Act of Parliament which has not been put in by Parliament.  

Those two elements of the Judgment are frankly disgraceful, Lady Hale and her fellow Judges stepping completely and unjustifiably outside their legitimate role and function as Judges and making judgments on issues which are not before them and on which the persons affected have not been allowed to make any representations.  Frankly what annoys me as a lawyer is the sheer lack of professional competence in the way the Judgment is reasoned and the way in which the scope of the judgment goes quite improperly beyond the parties and issues involved.

Two final and closing points on what is a depressing evening

In para 8 Lady Hale goes into depressing detail concerning various methods of Abortion provision and says, in passing.

"Feticide is also carried out where there is a risk of the foetus being born alive following the termination"

To which I can only respond "a risk" ? So she happily accepts that the purpose of the legislation is amongst other things to ensure that babies who might be born alive are prevented from being born alive.

In para 14 she looks at the organisation of the Labour Ward where the Midwives worked

"Since 2010, there have been about 6000 births a year at the Southern General Hospital and just under 60 terminations a year in the Labour Ward."

Therefore since Abortions are just 1% of the work in this ward it would not have caused Glasgow NHS any real difficulties to have "reasonably accommodated" the conscientious objections of these Midwives.

In conclusion the case is an overall disaster for good honourable pro-life Doctors and Nurses who may well find themselves either pushed out of medicine altogether or forced to accept that they can never progress and accept supervisory medical posts 

Jehovah Witnesses and Blood Transfusions

For some strange reason the press today are covering two stories about cases that happened months ago see the Guardian &  the Telegraph  for example.

The cases both relate to Jehovah Witnesses and their well known disapproval of  Blood Transfusions.  

In NHS v Child B [2014] EWHC 3486 (Fam)(01 August 2014) Mr Justice Moylan permitted Doctors to give a Blood Transfusion to, what he described as "a very young child" against the wishes of the childs devout Jehovah Witness parents. 

In para 5 the Judge noted
"It is the unanimous view of the clinical team that the best practice treatment of B is skin grafting and that there is a significant risk that he will require a blood transfusion during this procedure."

and in para 10
"the consultant expresses the opinion that, in the event of a skin graft taking place without the ability to give a blood transfusion, there is a risk of death."

The Judge summed up his decision in para 18
My decision must be determined by my assessment of what is in B's best interests because my paramount consideration is B's welfare. In reaching my decision, based on balancing all the factors bearing on the issue of B's welfare, I must weigh in that balance the wishes, opinions and views of B's parents. They alone have parental responsibility. But, as Ward LJ said in In re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, although I must give "very great respect" to the parents' wishes, they are "subordinate to welfare".

This decision therefore was predictable because the Court was having to take a decision on behalf of a child who could not make his own informed decision

By contrast in Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals Foundation Trust v LM [2014] EWCOP 454 (26 February 2014) Mr Justice Peter Jackson refused to allow Doctors to administer a Blood Transfusion to a  "gravely ill 63-year-old female Jehovah's Witness." known as LM, in para 11 he noted 

"On 12 February, LM was seen by two doctors in the gastroenterology team. She told them that she was adamant that she would not want treatment with any blood products. They felt that she had full capacity to make this decision with an awareness of the consequences.".  

Following this condition of LM deteriorated so that she could not communicated. The Hospital was concerned as to whether she could be given a Blood Transfusion which might help her or whether to respect her wishes and see her die.  

The Judge decided para 21
"I am satisfied that LM understood the nature, purpose and effects of the proposed treatment, including that refusal of a blood transfusion might have fatal consequences."

and on that basis the Judge ruled that a Blood Transfusion should not be given and subsequently LM died.

Neither case creates any new law or sets out any new principle.  The question in both cases was the same namely is the person needing the Transfusion in any position to make a decision refusing the treatment.  In the case of a child the answer was No so the Court made the decision but in the case of the adult the answer was yes so their decision was respected.  

Equality Guidance published by Catholic Bishops

A new guidance document 

Applying Equality Law in Practice: Guidance for Catholics and Catholic Organisations

has been published by the Christian Responsibility and Citizenship Department of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales.

The Bishops Conference says that the new Guidance 

"Will help Catholics gain a deeper understanding of this area of law and remove any misconceptions caused by its perceived complexity. It is important to note that the guide is not intended as a replacement for specialist legal advice.

The guide makes clear that if any issue arises that might lead to liability under equality law, it is strongly recommended that reader consults a solicitor or legal advisor."

About the guide, Archbishop Peter Smith, chairman of the Christian Responsibility and Citizenship Department said

"The aim of this guide is to offer some clear practical guidance on a complex area of law. It is not a substitute for taking professional legal advice but it aims to raise awareness on what the law allows and to enable potential problems to be anticipated and averted.

"There is both scope and sometimes a need for Catholics to make use of the new law’s provisions which can protect religious freedom."

Whilst the Guidance is, of course, primarily aimed at the needs of Catholics and Catholic organisations it should be of interest to any Religious Organisation looking to understand what their legal rights are

Freedom of Speech and Oxford University Students

Back in 2012 I wrote a blog about Students at University College London trying to dictate how the subject of Abortion should be handled in University debates and trying in effect to prevent pro-life groups having any platform.

 Sadly the same intolerant views have surfaced in Oxford University where Christ Church College has caved into intimidation and have cancelled a debate on "Abortion Culture" organised by Oxford Students for Life who had arranged for there to be 2 speakers 1 for and 1 against but even that degree of balance was not enough for the pro-abortion crowd who were pretty blatant about the intimidation and disruption they planned

“We thought we should go and say hi! Bring your friends, and if you want take along some non-destructive but oh so disruptive instruments to help demonstrate to the anti-choicers just what we think of their ‘debate’.”

This particular Face Book page has now, for some reason, been removed but I saw it myself before it was removed and can testify to the words used.  It was headed with the words "What the f*** is an abortion culture ?" using the full "F" word.  Frankly I have represented crack head yobs who could express themselves more elegantly than those "students" at what is supposed to be one of the leading Universities in the world

Anyway the actions of the members of the threatening disruptive group could constitute a criminal offence of Harassment under s1A Protection from Harassment Act 1997 as applied by s7(3A) of the same Act.  In addition the College, and Oxford University as a whole, has a legal duty under s43 Education (No 2) Act 1986 to 

"“ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers”

and both the college and the University appear to have failed in their legal as well as their moral responsibilities.  Freedom of speech is precious and without freedom of speech no other freedoms are safe.  It should never be forgotten that in Nazi Germany it was idealistic students who were the first ones to throw books into the flames.  Those students who succeeded in stopping this debate probably consider themselves to be radical left wingers but the reality is that they are fascists who need to be faced up to and defeated.  

UPDATE  19 November 

In researching this subject and trying to make sense of some of the jargon on the oppositions Facebook page I discovered that I am a "Cisgendered Binary person without a Uterus" otherwise known as a Male (and they say Lawyers overcomplicate !)

An "Interesting" in the sense of "Completely Self Centred arrogant" article in The Independent  by one of the protesters who got the talk cancelled 

However not all is Doom and Gloom the Twitter Feed of a certain Will Neaverson (who seems to be an Officer at Christ Church) states (Nov 16)  "I'm proposing a motion to request my college not grant permission for Oxford Students for Life to host a 'debate' on abortion. Updates soon." which would normally have upset me until I noticed that he describes his current status as "Researching for North Korea thesis".  

which made me laugh out loud. An Oxford student studying North Korea who wants to close down democratic debate in Oxford, you simply couldn't make it up.  He is obviously a very good student of his subject. 

Abortion Back in the Legal Spotlight

Abortion is back in Court in 2 cases at present.

The Supreme Court is hearing an Appeal by Glasgow NHS against the decision of the Court of Session recognising the right to conscientious objection of Midwives laid down in  Doogan & Anor v NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health Board [2013] ScotCS CSIH_36  

I discussed this case in this Blog at

Call the Midwife - I want an Abortion !        7  MARCH 2012
and

Call the Midwife I want an Abortion ! - 2    24  APRIL 2013

so I shall await the Supreme Court decision with interest and in the hope that it will confirm the clear and well reasoned decision of the Court of Session in April 2013

At the other end of the Courts structure a Doctor has been summonsed to appear at Manchester Magistrates Court in response to a private prosecution relating to alleged Abortions offered because of the Gender of the Unborn Child.  It is argued by the prosecutor that Gender Selection Abortion is illegal under the terms of the Abortion Act 1967

I covered this issue in my Blog post "Is Sex Selective Abortion Illegal ?  8 September 2013" when I came to the reluctant conclusion that Sex Selective Abortion, though morally repugnant, was not illegal.  I therefore do not expect the private prosecution to succeed however I wish the prosecutors well and will be delighted if I am proved wrong and the Abortionist in question is convicted.

Finally on a Non Abortion , but linked, issue the Court of Appeal are currently considering whether Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in a child caused by the grossly excessive drinking of his mother during her pregnancy could be a crime under s23 Offences Against the Person Act 1861. 

23 Maliciously administering poison, &c. so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm.
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to or cause to be administered to or taken by any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, so as thereby to endanger the life of such person, or so as thereby to inflict upon such person any grievous bodily harm, shall be guilty 

The issue in the case does not involve an actual prosecution but relates to an attempt to obtain some financial compensation for the severely injured child involved.  Since the Mother has no money the claim was pursued under the Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme which is why it was necessary to argue that the conduct was a crime.  As a practicing criminal lawyer, I do not believe that this case will lead to pregnant women being prosecuted over their drinking or other habits it will I think be seen by the Court of Appeal that the criminal law is being used as a "peg" for a civil claim. 

That said though I am very sympathetic to the Child in the case I think there may be real problems in establishing that the mother, however excessive her drinking, was acting either unlawfully or maliciously and that problem was what caused the case to be lost in the Upper Tribunal in CICA v FTT and CP (CIC) [2013] UKUT 638 (AAC).  We shall just have to wait and see what the Court of Appeal decides.

Incidentally I was slightly involved in the case wearing my Thomas More Legal Centre hat.  The Abortion provider BPAS and the organisation Birthrights applied to become Intervenors in the case in order to argue for the complete bodily autonomy of the woman so I became involved acting for the Pro-Life Alliance in arguing as Intervenor for the equal rights and dignity of the unborn child

It may well be that the Court of Appeal will ignore both interventions and concentrate instead on the wording of the 1861 Act and the details of the Criminal Injuries scheme but I am glad to have had some small part in ensuring that the arguments of BPAS were countered and the Court was reminded that unborn children are human and entitled to respect and dignity